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In the 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
Matter of the Estate 
of 
CHLOE RYAN CALL, 
Deceased. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
986) 
The testatrix, Chloe R. Call, made and 
executed her ~ill at Provo, Utah, Jctober 
29, 1953, and she died April 21, 1957, at 
Provo, Utah, leaving surviving her two child 
ren, bessie Call Nielson, daughter, and Orv1 
~. Call, son, and two nephews, Don Lewis Hya 
and William K. Ryan, and a niece Phyllis F. 
Ryan Hastings. That her son Orvis w. Call 
was a building contractor who had begun 
building homes on part of the real property 
while testatrix was still living on the 
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property. (Tr. 25, '2-)4, -1-42). That on 
Maroh 28, 1957, and on April 2, 1951, teat-
atr1x d1Yided and deeded all of her propert7 
oons1at1Dg or a Yery old hoae and un1~roYed 
buil41ng lota to the two oh114ren by separ-
ate deeda (Exh1b1ta 1 aDd 2) after testatrix 
entered the hospital on her laat illneaa 
(Tr. 4)). ~at without the knowledge or 
t .. tatrix while she was still in the hospital 
oa her deathbed, the children on April 10, 
1957, deeded by two deeds (Exhibits J and 4) 
back to their aother the said property of 
aald estate for obYious tax adYantagea. 
(B. 22, 88, 89, 90, 91, Tr. J?-)8). 
That on JulJ 22, 1960, the aon Or.1a w. 
Call died aa a result of a truck accident 
(Tr. 12) after aale from aaid estate of cer-
tain building lota (Tr. 29, Bs )2, J9, 52, 
59) and thereafter on Ma7 24, 1962, the 
appellant Don Lewis B7an filed a Petition 
protesting the propoaed aale or the 60 Jear 
old hoae by the Executrix Beaaie Call 11elaon 
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~ R • ? ., } and &. J p ~-> 1 :. ant ~ r.i 1·e o .... ., "o E e c. u t r 1 x 
answer oeti~loneJ f0r an 1nteroreta 1 n Jf 
the ~lll of s~id Chloe ~c ~al! af~er ~emov-
ne ower Court af~e1 
c.on: ider~ ng t!·1e '3. -'guments and briefs of t!"e 
s!ons Jf ~aw and Judgment and Decr~e (R. 
9 9-1 0 l ) t n a ;_ t t e t e s t a t r 1 x in~- ended her 
chlldren to have al~ of the property of ~er 
e5tate a~1 that tne same vested n sa1d ~~1 
L.hRt ~here ~-s nucr,~ng !.n the ""ll1 wn.l::::h sta 
')r -~reatf's 9 llfe estat~ Oli.J y a d t- 1at th.c 
anc i r: v L 11 :::~ F' , Ryan Ha .::> t 1 ng s, d :. "e, e e 
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POINT I. 
THAT PARAGRAPH SECOND OF THE WILL 
OF CHLOE R. CALL CREATES A FEE SIMPLE 
TITLE IN THE CHILDREN OF TESTATRIX IF 
THEY SURVIVE HER. 
Paragraph Second of the Will of Chloe 
R. Call reads: "All the rest, residue and 
remainder or my estate, I give, devise and 
bequeath to my daughter Bessie Call Niel 
and to my son, Orvis w. Call, in equal ~~ 
divided shares, share and share alike." 
(R. 18). 
All of the cases found by writer hold 
that such wording creates an absolute fee 
simple grant ~r interest to the named take. 
Counsel for appellant have never quoted 
any authority for a different proposition 
or meaning of such wording. To mean any-
thing different than that a fee has been 
created, this wording would have to be 
coupled with different or additional word-
ing which does not appear in this Will or 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
f'· 
-5-
additional wording required b7 eases in-
terpreting a life estate. Subsequent wo~ 
1ns contained 1n said Will atteapta to pre 
vide what happens !! !h! event !h! ch1ldrt 
!2 !!2! get ~ fee rather than to design 
that the fee abould go to someone else. 
The prior1tJ of interest of the testatrix 
ia to provide pr1aar1~y for her childrea 
aa tbe first takers and not for the last 
•·· takers. The property cona1at1ng of the 6l 
Jear old hoae and unlaproved bu1ld1a« lot1 
would be a 11ab111tJ to a llfe tenant be-
oauae lt would bring little or no 1nco•e 
and taxes and special asseasmenta wo•ld 
have to be paid. 
The ease or Scho•p ••· Brown, J)S P. 
2nd 847, Oregon, 1959, 1a one or the aaDJ 
recent cases dealing with the queation of 
whether a life estate is ereatel where a 
clauae g1vea an interest to a aecond take 
upon death or a f1rat taker. The Schaap 
case waa where a husband and w1te ude ., 
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r e c 1 p r o c a .. r 1ll s ~ ~ v i I .g , ~ ~, e r ~ 1 ~ " 1 n a.., 
spouse first dylng w1th a :trt over \o 
~hildren as provJa~d ln the Wll s. Tt 
was held tha' th 1 s wore; 1 ng Cl"e .. :::! in sa.1"" 
surv1 ving spouse an ~o~o u~ f'f e and. d.i 
not impreSS 8 trust r.I ..-.!.fe estate for ~\.,.e 
children., 
Where testator devised rlflall t.!le 1 es!. 
dle and remainder of my es:.ate .. ·· suet 
Ehras,.e creat~E_ ~ fee, though t>~/ roras of 
lim1ta.tion or inheritance are adde1 
P a. r k E, r ,., • ...·a. :r· ;-c e r 4 6 Ma. s s ., ( 5 Me t c " J 1 1! ~ l _, 
lJ!lA..ll the rest;;, res 1due and rema~:1de"' 
of my e:sta te, ~ as used 1n c) wi 1 J ls nt1 .. n< " 
as a "genera1, d~scriptl<.Jn or a~ 1 th.o .. Jr<lp 
erty testa. t 0r had 1 ef't ln tb.e wo=~ll, .. ,, :r.<~;~e 
real, persona~ or mixed, after the payment 
of debts and specific le~acies.• Chapman 
v. Chic~, 16A« 407,409 81 Me,l09. 
rhe ~ord •reQalnder@~ 1n the la~ a~ 
real es~ate, necessarily impl~es what 1s 
left, and if the ent1.re estate ln fee oe 
granted, there ca.z.l b.e no remalnd'er-:--J:-Is 
an established principle of construct1 l 
of cont1np;erJt r'em&linc~ers that an esta"'~ 
cannot oy -- :ieed t1e llw 1 ted. to an .. oth er fH e r 
a fee already granted.. Palmer "'!,. Coo} ·~2 
NE 7 96 (Ill .. ) ., 
We agree th9. a:.1 r.::sta.te •rested at 
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testator's death but it vested in the 
children and not in Ryan. 
The law favors the vesting of estates, 
especiallY !h!g giTen !2 children or those 
standing in like relation to the testator; 
and under such circumstances it iapoaes 
such a construction of the terms or a will 
as will create a vested estate if possible. 
Jones v. Pueblo Savings & Truat Co. 87 P 
2nd 2,10) Colo. 455. 
The law favors the earl7 vesting of 
testaaentary gifts, and unless contrary 
intention cleAr~y appears in will, interest 
will be regar e as vested' rather than 
contingent. Com'1. Mat. Bk. of Kansas Cit7 
v. Martin, J40 P2nd 899,185 Kan. 116 (1959). 
In re Collias• Estate (Cal. 1951) 2)) 
P2nd 554. •rt is clear that the sentence 
'All the rest and residue or •Y estate ••••• 
I giTe, devise and bequeath unto ay nephew 
••••• • standing alone, would bequeath the 
property to Argirios (nephew) absolutely.• 
Thus, that estate will not be limited by 
subsequent words unless they indicate as 
clear an intention therefor as was shown 
by the words creating the estate. Words 
of instruction to give one half of estate 
to relatives in Greece do not impose a 
legally enforceable duty or impose a trust 
upon property. To impose a trust on prop-
erty thus devised or bequeathed, it must 
appear that the testator intended to impose 
mandatory duties upon devisee. "Where the 
person directed to carry out the wishes of 
the testator is both executor and legatee, 
the courts in construing the effect of the 
language haTe refused to follow the strict 
rule which iaposes a mandatory duty on the 
executor and have apparently treated the 
words as being addressed to hi• in his 
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oapae1ty as legatee• (and thus precatory). 
A devise of the residue of a teatator 1'S 
property passes all of the property wh1eh 
he .as entitled to devise or bequeath at 
the t1me of his death or bequeathed by hi 
will. Prusa v. Beasley (Okl. 1958) 335 
P2nd J46. 
Paragraph of will devising land to 
testator's wife was clear and unambiguous 
and wife took a fee simple title to land, 
not a life estate, notwithstanding subse-
quent paragraph of will providing that 1t 
was testator's will and desire that all 
property devised to wife that remained 
her property at time of her death should 
be equally divided among thelr three 
children, and wife had right to dispose 
of land by will. (Okla. 1958) Shippy v. 
Elliott 327 P2nd 645. 
"I give, devise and bequeath to my 
wife, Lillie Maud Fields, all the rest, 
res11ue and remainder of my property" 
created a fee simple title that could not 
be cut down or limited to a life estate 
by subsequent words that "the remainder 
of my property devised and bequeathed to 
her by me th~t shall be in her possession 
at the time of her death shall be divided 
in equal shares between my sons." Fields 
v. Fields (Oreg.) J P2nd 77l. Rehearing 
den1e·1 7 ?2nd '?75 and quotes 1 Underhill 
on ~ills Sec. J58: "~here an absolute 
gift is given in clear and expressive, or, 
as sometimes expressed, 1n positive and 
decisive language, the rule of construc-
tion is that the interest thus glven shall 
not be taken away, cut down, limited or 
diminished by subsequent vague and general 
expressions. In other words, any subse-
quent expression of intention of the 
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testator must, in order to limit the prior 
gift, be equally clear and intelligible, 
and indicate an intention to that effect 
with reasonable certainty." 
POINT II. 
THAT IF SAID ~ILL SUBSE~UENTLY ATTEMPTS 
TO CREATE A LESSER ESTATE IN THE FIRST 
TAKERS, SUCH LESSER ESTATE IS REPUGNANT 
TO THE FEE ESTATE FIRST CREATED. 
The children of testatrix were the 
primary beneficiaries of said will and 
subsequent language in the will was intended 
to prevent a lapse in the event a fee did 
not vest in said children. Any interpre-
tation of subsequent language that cuts 
down the absolute grant to the children 
in Paragraph Second of the will is repug-
nant to the interest stated to the children 
as first takers. 
To point out the repugnancy contained 
in the will of Chloe Call, let us consider 
the wording of the Paragraph Fifth which 
purportedly grants to Don Lewis Ryan a fee 
reversion subject to life estates of Bessie 
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Call Nielson and Orvis ~. Call, to-wit: 
"I direct that upon the death of my daugh-
ter Bessie Call Nielson and upon the death 
of my son Orvis w. Call, that the shares 
herein devised to them, shall go to my 
nephew Don Lewis Ryan of Heber, Utah." 
Now did Testatrix mean that all of the 
shares given to the children should go 
to Ryan? Obviously not, because that would 
mean that she gave nothing to the children. 
Then what part of the children's share 
did she intend go to Ryan--only that which 
they did not use in their lifetimes? The 
Testatrix does not say this anywhere in 
the will nor does she ever mention that 
the children shall have only the income 
and cannot invade the corpus. 
A literal application leaves nothing 
to the children because all of their shares 
devised by the will to them would go to 
Ryan, even their share of the property 
constituting income from their alleged 
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life interests. The will never mentions 
a life estate, income vs. corpus, unused 
portions, unconsumed principal, trust or 
any other legal divisions or controls nec-
essary to determine how much the children 
get and how much that Ryan is to get. 
There ls not, therefore, any logical basis 
to divide the estate between the children 
and ayan. This is why the wording giving 
all of the estate to the children and the 
wording giving~ of the children's share 
under the will to Ryan is repugnant or 
directly contrary. 
The voluminous annotation on this doc-
trine of repugnancy without exception sup-
ports the interpretation that in wording 
similar to the Chloe H. Call will a fee 
is created in the first takers (children) 
and that subsequent language repugnant to 
such fee is void and ineffectual. 17 ALh 
2nd l-227. On pages 72 and 87 of said 
annotation appears the following: "The 
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rule prevailing in nearly all jurisdictions 
is that where the bequest, devise, or gran 
is sufficient in its terms to carry the f 
or if personalty the analogous interest, 
and is construed to have that effect, a 
purported limitation over of property re-
maining undisposed of, or all of the prop-
erty if undisposed of, is wholly void. 
The more usual ground of such holding, 
sometimes found joined or blended with 
others, 1s that the limitation over is re-
pugnant to the estate of the first taker. 
Where the language of the bequest, 
devise, or grant to the first taker in-
cludes words or inheritance or perpetuity, 
or is by its express terms absolute or in 
fee, the cases are, 1n general, strongly 
inclined to construe the instrument as 
vesting in such taker the fee or analogous 
interest, and to reject the life estate 
construction, and accordingly to hold the 
limitation over of property not disposed 
of void by virtue of the commonly prevail-
ing doctrine concerning executory limita-
tions of that sort. 
Very recent cases continue to bear 
out this doctrine: 
"'N'hen an estate ln an absolute fee 
ls given in one clause or will, the inter-
est which the devisee there obtains cannot 
be taken away or diminished by any subse-
quent or general expressions of doubtful 
import, or by any inference deducible 
therefrom that may be repugnant to the 
estate given." Schornp v. Brown, supra. 
In re Schira•s Will: A fee, once 
given, cannot be cut down, by other pro-
visions of the will, and remainder cannot 
be engrafted upon a fee. In case of a 
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conflict between testator's intention and 
settled rules of law, the latter must pre-
vail. Where a will has two possible in-
terpretations, that which complies with 
the law will be preferred to that which 
violates the law. ~here a fee is clearly 
given, a limitation over of the remainder 
is vold as inconsistent with the fee 
granted, whether the gift over is expressed 
to be of what remains, or may be left or 
the residue or is on death of the first 
taker without having disposed of the prop-
erty. An attempt to dispose of remainder 
of the estate the first legatee or devisee 
chose to leave is, in effect, attempting 
to meke a will for the first devisee, to 
take effect in case the first devisee falls 
to make one for himself or otherwise dis-
pose of the property--this the testator 
cannot do. If it is found that one clause, 
standing alone, clearly evinces a purpose 
to create a certain interest, and the sub-
sequent language merely operates to create 
a doubt about the testator's intent in 
that particular, the latter words will be 
disregarded. In re Schira•s Will, 165 NE 
2nd 60, Ohio 1959. 
Clarkson v. Bliley, (Va.) 38 SE 2nd 
22, 171 ALR 1308, holds "an estate in fee 
to wife of residue of testator's property 
is not cut down to a life estate by a sub-
sequent clause where testator attempted, 
upon deatn of the wife, to dispose of the 
property to his wtfe's nephew, the attemp-
ted limitation over being void for repug-
nancy." 
PO I NT I I ;_. 
l'!-iAT THE PHOPERTY OF THE ::~,::)TATE 3HOULC 
';I) 'rO T'-JE NEPHE'...J DON LEWI.3 RYAN ONlY IN rJ;E 
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c1ENT BOTH CHILDREN JF TESTATR X DIED 
B~FORE SAID TESTATRIX. 
rhe Will of Chloe Call is not unusual 
in its general form. The meaning of the 
~ill fits the general pattern of simple 
wills if the children are considered the 
primary objects of Testatrix' bounty. The 
secret of the conflict between opposite 
advocates claiming under this Nill is the 
omission by the ~ill of a time or event in 
which the interest of Don Lewis Ryan attaches 
The literal wording saJ'S "upon the death" 
of both the children that Ryan gets "the 
shares herein devised to them." Now the 
Testatrix could not have meant that liter-
ally because the children would then be 
mere holders or conduits to take the estate 
t~ the nephew. It is much more reasonable 
to understand that the TPstatrlx meant that 
th~ nephew was to have the shares devised 
to the 0hildren if both the children pre-
deceased her. This is the more reasonable 
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when considered in light of the preTioua 
paragraph that the surTiT1ng child was to 
take the interest of a deceased child as 
is usually proTided in a will. If Para-
graph Fifth had said upon death of both 
children •before I die• that the shares 
of children would then go to Ryan, the 
whole controTersy here would be eliminated. 
It is not surprising therefore to find that 
this is the law of willa and the general 
rule is that where no time is fixed ror 
the vesting of an estate contingent upon 
the death of the first takers, that Test-
ator contemplated that deaths g! first 
takere ~ occur w1th1n Tostator•e ll£!-
!1!!· There ia no question but that the 
children are the first takers or all 2! 
~ estate and that Ryan's interest is 
contingent upon the deaths or both such 
children. If it is assumed that by Para-
graph Fifth that Testatrix meant that Ryan 
would get the whole estate devised to the 
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children as the will is alleged to state, 
she could only have meant that Ryan were 
to get the whole estate if the children 
both died before Testatrix. 
The case of Dawson v. McKee, 116 NE 
2nd 5J8, Indiana 1954, handled this prob-
lem where contingent beneficiaries claimed 
that first takers took a life estate where 
will provided for contingent beneficiaries 
if first takers died under certain condi-
tions as against claim of grandchildren 
that they took a vested fee upon death of 
Testator. The question was whether grand-
children took a fee title to property where 
they survived the Testator or whether they 
took a life interest that would descend to 
survivor or descendants of one or other or 
a nephew of 'restator. Held, when the 
grandchildren survived Testator, property 
vested absolutely in fee in them. The 
death mentioned by the Will meant and re-
ferred to death of grandchild or both 
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occurr1ng befo,r~ de~th o( Testator, and 
a1 adverse claimant had burden or )roo~ 
of proving Testator meant otherwise. 
"!/here will giving a~i-1 propef'ty ~ 
named grandchildren provided that (l) tf 
e1 thgr s 1ou i_d die w1 thout children or 
nair descendan~s surviving, his snare 
snould go to survivor of the grandchildren, 
(c.' 4 f both should die wlthout surviv rs., 
l:nas sho1 d go to a nephew, and (3) if 
e1th~r grandchild should die with c~tld 
surv~ving his share should go to such 
child, but testator dtd not clearly ~~x 
a time for occurrence of death of first 
takers affecting such prov~ sions, ~~~_ra.l 
rule would be a.12:e1 ~ed 1l ~nere.Qx .9.-~~-th 1~~ 
testator's lifetime would be deemed con· 
templated, and hence fee -·s7ffiple vest~" n 
named grandchildren when they Sl, rv 1 ved 
testator." 
~one seeking to avoid applic~tion of 
general rule of construct1on, wh~reby de-
vise conditioned on death of flrrc taker 
would be deemed to oon~~mplate d~ath dur-
ing testator's l1f~.:!t1i.De, had b·.ll'den of 
prov 1ng ~ def 1-r~_l te ~~ cert3.1!1 ·ctme con-
templated for such death." 
Another ca. s e set t; 1 ng c u l~ the generAl 
rnle ts Nickerson v. noove'. .. , 1919, 115 NE 
588: 
"The law fav~rs the ~esting of estates 
at the ea!'liest possible .uoment and a will 
should he cons t rued 8 ceo : i i ng l y 1 n the e t -~ 
sence ~f a clear men1feE~at1~n of the ln-
tentlon of the tes~~t0r to the contraryo 
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It is also well settled that where 
real estate is devised in terms denoting 
an intention that the primary devisee 
shall take a fee on the death of the 
testator, coupled with a devise over in 
case of death of such primary devisee 
without children or issue, the condition 
refers to a death without children or 
issue within the lifetime of the testator, 
and that, if the primary devisee survives 
the testator, he takes at the latter's 
death an estate in fee simple." 
Such a death provision with carry 
over to another is a lapse provision only 
and not intended to create a life estate 
in first taker as the rights of parties 
must be determined upon death of testator. 
See In re Young's Estate, (Cal. 19)1} 1 
P 2nd 523. 
"Where there is devise to one person 
in fee and in case of his death to another, 
contingency referred to is death of first-
named devisee during testator's ~·" 
Where testatrix devised property to 
her four named children and directed 
"either of them dieing, their share goes 
to the surviving above-mentioned children" 
the words "either or them dieing" mean 
death of any one of the devisees before 
death of testatrix and will could not be 
construed as giving testatrix's children 
a life estate only. Lewis v. McConchie, 
100 P 2nd 752, 151 Kan. 778. 
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Construction giving estate of inher-
itance to first deYisee is favored, and 
such estate cannot be reduced to life 
estate only by unambiguous proYiaiona. 
Will provided if testatrix's daughter died 
without issue, property would go to others. 
Court held this meant if ahe died without 
issue before testatrix. "To hold that it 
means death at any tiae would place a 
higher value on uncertainty than upon cer-
tainty as a goal in interpretatioD." Smith 
Y. Wood (Cal.) 20 P 2nd 48. 
Where testator made an unequivocal 
devise to the wife of the house as well 
as other property and then stated that the 
house at the wife's death should go to 
another, will was construed to proTide a 
bequest or all of the testator's property 
to the surYiving widow and the second clause 
was properly disregarded aa qualifying the 
clear and unambiguous provision or the 
first clause. In re Gormley's Eatate, JJ8 
P 2nd 457 (Calif. 1959). 
POINT IV. 
THAT SAID WILL GIVES THE PROPERTY OF 
THE ESTATE TO THE CHILDREN AT THE LAST CP 
SAID WILL AS WELL AS AT THE FIRST 0~ SAID 
WILL. 
Paragraph Seventh of said will gives 
the children or testatrix power to conYert 
the whole property of the estate by sale 
before the estate is closed and the proceeds 
thereof 1nvea.ted in American Telephone and 
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Telegraph Company stock in the names of 
said children in equal shares, share and 
share alike. This provision amounts to 
an absolute power of disposition in the 
children. It gives the stock to the 
children, not the Executors. Formerly, 
objections were sometimes raised that the 
power of sale was inconsistent with a 
fee, but the later eases above cited 1n 
1? ALR 2nd ?2 hold that such an absolute 
power of disposition 1s consistent with 
a fee and is only another way or saying 
that the first taker is to haTe the full 
benefits of the property deTised and that 
the power of disposition is an incident 
of the fee. 
Words and Phrases defines the meaning 
of "in equal shares• and "share and share 
alike" by quoting the following case: 
Words "in equal shares" or "share 
and share alike," used in testamentary gift 
of remainder to named children, import an 
absolute gift. In re Wilkin's Will, 2?8 
N.Y.S. 891 155 Misc. 152. 
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Even if you assume that thl~. will 
does not clearly create a tee in the first 
takers (children) the last mentioned powe~ 
of disposition in the children under Para-
graph SeTenth is held to be enough authority 
to convert a general or indef1n1te gift 
into a fee, to-wit: 
33 Am. Jur. 498, Section 36, Life 
Estate and Remainders, •It is a well-settled 
rule, firmly supported by a great numerical 
preponderance of the authorities, that where 
there is a devise or bequest to one in gen~ 
eral terms only, expressing neither fee 
nor life estate, and there is a subsequent 
11m1tat1on over of what remains at the first 
taker's death, 1f there is also given to 
the first taker an unlimited and unrestricted 
power of absolute disposal, express or 1m-
plied, the devise or bequest to the first 
taker is construed to pass a feeo The 
attempted 11m1tat1on over, following a gift 
whlch 1s in fee with full power of d1spos-
lt1on and alienation, is void. Most or the 
cases arriving at th1a conclusion are baaed 
upon the reasoning that the well-settled 
rule that a general or indefinite giftp 
coupled with an absolute or unlimited power 
or disposition, passes a fee applies with 
full force and effect even though the will 
purports to make a gift over of whatever 
may remain at the death of the devl.see, the 
purported gift over merely being an invalid 
repugnancy. 
The Utah statute, Sec~ 74-2-5, UCA 
1953, states: ~All the parts of a w111 
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are to be construed in relation to each 
other, and, 1.f possible, so as to form one 
consistent whole; but where several parts 
are absolutely irreconcilable, the later 
must prevail." 
In view of this statute the will shows 
that the first and last sentiments of the 
testatrix were to provide absolutely for 
her children if they survived her. The 
last gift also gives the property or the 
estate to both children ~n equal undivided 
shares, share and share alike" and the 
only provision of the will following is 
to appoint said children as Executors of 
the will to serve without bond. 
Counsel for appellant mention on page 
7 of their brief that the son, Orvis W. 
Call, needed protection from "known finan-
cial irresponsibility." It is true that 
the son had not been as wise and frugal 
as the daughter, Bessie Call Nielson, had 
been, and this 1s perhaps the reason that 
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1f the property were held 1n undivided 
shares by the children that 0rY18 would 
undoubtedly consult with h1a aister Bessie 
before encumbering or diapoa1ng or his 
share of the property. However, 1n both 
instances Paragraphs Second aDd SeYenth 
of the will grant the p~opertJ to the 
children outright and absolutely. 
POIKT V. 
THAT A LIPE ESTATI IS JOT STATIO Bl 
THE WILL AND THE POWER OF DISPOSITION OF 
THE PROPERTY GIVEN TO SAID CHILDREN DOES 
MOT CREATE AN •EXBCUTOBI LIMITATION OVER• 
TO THE NEPHEW DOH LEWIS BlAN. 
How eaa11J testatrix could haYe 
stated a life eatate to her ch114ren in-
stead of •all the rest, residue and re-
aainder.• The will nowhere ••1• life 
interest and the only place 1t mentions 
a •remainder• 11 in Paragraph Second where 
the grant 1a to the ch1ldrea. The life 
estate ra1aea onlJ oy inference and •uat 
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therefore fall. 
"Every devise of land 1n any will 
conveys all the estate of the devisor 
therein Which he could lawfullJ devise, 
unless 1t clearly appears by the will 
that he intended to convey a less estate." 
Section 74-1-)6, UCA 195). See also ?4-2-6, 
UCA 1953, stating that a clear and d1etinct 
gift prevails oYer inference from other 
parts of will. 
The authorities cited on Pages lJ and 
14 of appellant's brief simply do not fit 
the conditions stated in this will and 
counsel for appellant have still failed 
to apply as authority a single apec1f1c 
ease to the questions railed by the Chloe 
R. Call will. We recommend a careful read-
ing of the sections in JJ Am. Jur.; Life 
Estates, Remain.ders, etc. See. 19-41, and 
it will be found that the principles stated 
support respondent's contentions instead 
of appellant•se No case similar to this 
will holds that a fee 1s not granted by 
wording as contained in Paragraph Second. 
Any cases purporting to find a life estate 
instead of a fee are almost without 
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exception cases where 1h! will attempts 
to create a "limitation over• to a second 
taker by employing words giving to such 
second taker "whatever remains•, •property 
undisposed or•, •unconsumed portion", "what 
is left", •not used for support•, •residue• 
and so forth. There is no such language 
in the Chloe R. C&ll will. Such •unused 
portion: would remain .!!! 1:!.21 in hands of 
first taker at time of death of such first 
taker. This is a •ree• on a "fee• situa-
tion which the older cases would not allow 
but that are now allowed to operate on the 
unused balance of property which the first 
taker does not use du.r1ng his lifetime and 
thus may be carried over to the second 
taker. Appellant does not w1sh this doctrine 
of executory-limitation-over employed in 
this case however as the eases hold that 
the first taker may exhaust the property 
and convert the assets during the life of 
the first taker and the second taker then 
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has no estate or expectancy. This puts 
the second taker ln the category of a 
third-party beneficiary who may be dis-
possessed before realizing any estate. 
No, the appellant Ryan ls asking for a 
strict life estate and that the whole 
assets of the estate be preserYed for him 
and that the children haYe no r1ght to in-
vade the eorpus or expend the pr1nc1palo 
The appellant also expects a constructive 
trust to be applied to preserve the estate 
assets for him whether ln the form of real 
estate or the Telephone Company stock. If 
the l1m1tat1on-over theory applies (and we 
do not think 1 t ~ioes for the reason stated 
that the will says nothing about •property 
remaining or unconsumed") then the children 
would have the right to use the property 
"as they see fit" under the cases. 
There ls a difference of opinion yet 
today as to whether the 11mltat1on-over 
theory 1s applicable at all in a caae w 
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a fee is first stated in the will, as 
commented in 17 ALB 2nd )6 and 102~ to-wit: 
The general proposition supported by 
many cases is that where the first taker 
11 given, either expressly or bJ implica-
tion, what 1a commonly designated as "the 
absolute power of d1spos1t1on,• and the 
terms of the devise, bequest, or convey-
ance to him are approp~1ate to carry the 
fee, or if personalty the analogous in-
terest, he takes the property absolutelJ 
and an attempted 11m1tat1on over of any-
thing remaining undisposed of, or of the 
whole property if undisposed of, 1s void. 
The rule has been applied without regard 
to whether or not the limitation 11 con-
ditioned on any further event such as death 
of the first taker without issue surviving. 
However no case 1apoaea a strict life 
estate upon property given to first taker 
where a fee is stated to first taker, un-
less it is spec1f1oallx •entioned 1n the 
will as a life usage. 
See JJ Am. Jur., Life Estates, etc. 
Sections 29, )6, 37, J8, and 17 ALB 2nd 
1-227. 
POINT VI. 
THAT THE TRIAL COURT'S INTERPRETATION 
OF THE WILL IS CONSISTENT WITH THE WHOLE 
~ILL. 
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The w 111 vf Ch: oe B Call (1 ,res he 
surv1 v 1.n~ cr 1.1 ir en lt.Oe who, e ~st::J te 1n 
both Paragreoh 34 "one and Seven",n w1. tn 
no 11m1 "'at:. on to anyone e1 e e1 ~.1 'r • xi 1 ... 
or 1mplted in said Paragraph~. There 1S no 
life tenancy mentioned, n0 ,:ons;l"'tlctllue 
trust, no remainder to o1;!'i ur .. , no "tlnex 
pended portions" to go to other parties 
The .,111 speaks as of testa trlx • c.ea .-;n 
and vests 1n the li y·!.ng ohl,.d:~er: a fE oo, 
The will makes no distinction between the 
corpus of the estate or principal thEre~ 
as contrasted with income or profits 
thereof. To interpret strictly or liter-
ally all the shares devtsed by the wtJ 
to the children goes t) the nephew Ryan, 
but this would fly in the face of the 
Janguage giving the chlldren equal shares 
of ~ the Ero2ertl 1n the first and last 
gifts of the wlll. The court would h6ve 
to find a constructive trust on the te e-
phone stock 1n the names of the children 
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-29-
share and share alike to prevent the 
children from disposing of the property 
nephew Ryan in expectancy. This strict 
interpretation as appJied to this will 
would impose a burden on the children 
rather than a benefit and would be con-
trary to the expressed intention of the 
will to give absolutely to the children 
all of the estate in equal shares, share 
and share alike. It would have been 
better to give the estate outright to Ryan 
as testatrix knew the property had little 
or no income value. Testatrix also knew 
her son was a building contractor who com-
menced building homes on the property dur-
ing her occupancy and testatrix in fact 
deeded all the estate to her children be-
fore she died (See StatP,ment of ~acts) but 
said children recorded deeds back to their 
mother while she lay on her deathbed in 
the hospital. 
The will should logically be inter-
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-)D-
preted as follows: 
First, that the Testatrix conveyed 
all of the property to her ch1Jd~en in 
equa • undivided shares, share and share 
alike. 
Second, that all of the property 
should go to the daughter, Bessie Call 
Nielson, tn the event she should survive 
the Testatrix and Orvis w. Call. 
Th1 rd, that all of the property sho1 .ld 
go to the son, Orvis W. Call 1n ths event 
he should survive both the Testat~lx and 
Bessie Call Nielson. 
Fourth, that in the event both of 
said children died before Testatrix, that 
the property of the estate should go to 
the nephew, Don Lewis Ryan. 
Fifth, in the event that the property 
does not go to the children Bessie or Orvis 
and in the event the property does not go 
to the nephew, Don Lewis Ryan, the prop-
erty should go to William K. Ryan and 
Phyllis F. Ryan Has~:1ngs, 1n equal shares, 
share and share alike. 
Sixth, that during administration 
the children can sell the property of the 
estate and place the proceeds thereof in 
American Telephone Company stock in the 
names of Bessie Call Nielson and Orv1s w. 
Call in equal, undivided shares, shar~ and 
share alike .. 
It would seem that since both ch1ldrer~ 
surv1ved testatrix, the logical 1nte~t1;n 
would favor a vesting of a fee almpl e ~··state 
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in the children as direct descendents of 
testatrix. 
CONCLUSION 
We cannot find any support that the 
executory-limitation-over doctrine 1s 
applicable to the Call Will, but we do 
find that each legal argument returns to 
the conclusion that a fee was given by 
testatrix to the children and that Ryan 
was mentioned and intended to get the 
estate if a lapse occurred caused by the 
deaths of the children before the testa-
tr1x. We have cited ample authority and 
uncontroverted cases for thls proposition. 
The judgment of the lower court should 
be affirmed g.1v1ng the children a fee simple 
title. 
J. Rulon Morgan and 
Dean w. Payne 
Respectfully submitted, 
MORGAN AND PAYNE 
128 East Center Street 
Provo, Utah 
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